Having the Right Appellate Team Matters: A Look at Two Appellate Decisions

The Appellate Division of New Jersey rarely publishes cases because doing so “creates law.” Over the past 3 months, Matheu D. Nunn, Managing Partner and Chair of the Firm’s Appellate and Family practices, obtained two such decisions with the assistance of key appellate practice member, Jessie M. Mills, Esq., as well as other contributing attorneys at the Firm.

On February 10, 2026, the Appellate Division issued a published opinion in S.M.T. v. S.A., ___ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. Feb. 10, 2026), a case arising under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA). After crediting our client’s testimony, the trial court nonetheless characterized much of the defendant’s conduct as “marital contretemps,” and suggested the parties’ pending divorce could adequately mitigate any risk faced by our client. The Appellate Division disagreed. Applying the two-step framework from Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112 (App. Div. 2006), which requires that the court first (a) determine whether an act of domestic violence has occurred, before (b) deciding whether an FRO is required to prevent further acts of domestic violence, the Appellate Division determined that the physical violence performed by the defendant showed that an FRO was necessary for the protection of our client. Two legal principles from S.M.T. carry particular weight.

• First, the court reaffirmed that “not much is required” to prove bodily injury for simple assault-even slight, intentional contact causing physical pain suffices. When the predicate act involves physical force–especially where there is a prior assault–the second-prong analysis is often “self-evident.” Stated differently, where an assault occurs, the “need” for a restraining order is often established even without a prior history of domestic violence. The Appellate Division also rejected the trial court’s reliance on “marital contretemps,” and made clear that a pending divorce is not a substitute for a restraining order, absent mutually agreed civil restraints.
• Second, the court contemplated the scope of the New Jersey Legislature’s 2024 amendment to the PDVA, which added “coercive control” as a consideration as to whether a restraining order is needed to prevent future domestic violence. SeeJ.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(7). Coercive control encompasses the pattern that binds incidents together—surveillance, isolation, economic control, baseless threats, and interference with movement or parenting that unreasonably interferes with a person’s liberty or bodily integrity. The S.M.T. record documented monitoring and restriction of movements and communications, manipulation of home access and technology, financial control, and decisions that isolated the plaintiff from support. Those circumstances, combined with proven assaults, compelled the conclusion that an FRO was necessary to prevent further abuse.

On the other hand, on December 1, 2025, the appellate team obtained a reversal of a final protective order issued against the Firm’s client. The Appellate Division issued a published opinion in A.C. v. R.S., reversing a Final Protective Order under the Victim’s Assistance and Survivor Protection Act (VASPA), because the plaintiff failed to prove a statutory predicate offense. A.C. v. R.S., ___ N.J. Super. ___ (App. Div. Dec. 1, 2025). Although the appellate court recognized that text messages can qualify as “online” under VASPA, it found that a threat to tell an employer about a consensual relationship—without more—was neither a threat of injury to property nor a threat to commit a crime, and because no predicate act was proved, the protective order was vacated.

Whether you are seeking protection from abuse or defending against an unwarranted petition, we bring the same commitment to every client. Our record makes clear that having the right appellate team matters. Our record of achieving positive outcomes, and shaping law, reflect our commitment to representing our clients every step of the way.